Despite intensive investigation, little evidence has been found for a traditional Richardson style arms race between Greece and Turkey using regression methods. This paper uses an alternative model of the arms race, which treats it as a simple repeated two by two game like Prisoners' Dilemma, in which each country can choose a high or low share of military expenditure. This gives four possible states: both high; Greece high Turkey low; Turkey high Greece low; both low. The strategies of each country, the choice probabilities given the current state, are then estimated using a discrete state regime-switching model, which estimates the transition probabilities between the four states. Various hypotheses about these strategies are tested as restrictions on these transition probabilities. One set of hypotheses is that the countries play 'titfor-tat' doing what their opponent did in the previous period. This is rejected for both countries.
Introduction
The antagonism between the two NATO allies Greece and Turkey has provoked a large amount of defence economics research. Brauer (1999) provides an encyclopaedic survey. However, despite numerous attempts, it has proved difficult to find a robust Richardson type arms-race between the two countries. Regressions estimating dynamic linear reaction functions between the military expenditures of the two countries tend to show wrong signs, lack of cointegration, or extreme sensitivity to minor features of the specification such as the choice of dummy variables or exact definitions of the data, which are themselves subject to serious measurement difficulties. Dunne et al. (1999) contrast the Greece-Turkey case with the India-Pakistan case, where it is fairly easy to get stable, cointegrating reaction functions. As Brauer (1999) points out, the relationship between Greek and Turkish military expenditure shows marked structural changes and this is not suprising because their military expenditures are influenced by many other factors. In principle, one might imagine constructing a well-specified regression equation, which controlled for all these other influences. In practice, this is not an attractive research strategy because all these influences are very difficult to measure precisely. Reflecting this Brauer (1999) says 'Running more single or simultaneous regression equations, even when incorporating all the latest quirks of mathematical statistics, is unlikely to much advance our substantive knowledge'.
Although the Richardson model of the arms race has dominated empirical work, it is not the only model. The natural theoretical starting point is the Prisoners' Dilemma and this is where Sandler & Hartley (1995, section 4 .1) start their discussion of arms races. Brauer (1999) notes that the literature on the conflict between Greece and Turkey never addresses it from a game-theoretic view. In this paper we try to remedy that omission and model the process as a simple two by two game. We will treat the arms race as an iterated simple game in which each year, each country can choose either a high or low share of military expenditure for the next period, knowing what the other has chosen this period. We cannot observe the payoffs the countries face but we can observe their strategy: the probabilities with which each country chooses high or low in the next period, conditional on the state in this period. In this paper, we suggest a way to estimate the strategies and test hypotheses about them in the context of such a two by two game.
One interesting hypothesis this viewpoint suggests is whether the countries play a tit-for tat strategy: doing in the next period what the other country did this period. This strategy has attracted a lot of attention, since it performs well in iterated Prisoners' Dilemma as long as there is not too much noise, Axelrod (1997) . Of course, in this case there is a lot of noise, the impact of other political and strategic factors. Another interesting hypothesis is that the two countries make their decisions independently, i.e. that they are not in fact arms racing. This would be consistent with 'internal' explanations which emphasise bureaucratic or political inertia in military decisions.
We begin by comparing the Richardson and simple game approaches to modelling arms races and providing a non-technical presentation of the estimation method. Then we set out the stochastic specification which we use to estimate the arms-race game, present the estimates and tests and finally make some concluding remarks.
Alternative Approaches to Estimating Arms Races The Regression Approach
The standard approach to estimating an arms race has been to use linear regression on some variant of the Richardson model. The original Richardson model was a pair of differential equations which simultaneously determined the weapons acquisitions of two countries.
Expressing it in discrete time with the addition of stochastic error terms and other determinants the model can be written as: Countries could also follow mixed strategies, choosing high with some probability p and low with some probability ) 1 ( p − . Mixed strategies are optimal for quite a wide range of games. We will assume that countries play conditional mixed strategies: choosing a probability of being high or low next year depending on the current state. Our aim is to estimate these strategies and see what light it sheds on the interaction between Greek and Turkish military expenditures. This is the reverse of the usual approach in game theory. The usual approach is to specify the payoffs and then determine the optimal strategy. Here we do not observe the payoffs; but we do observe the strategies the players adopt: whether they choose high or low. This allows us to make inferences about the nature of the game.
This game approach differs from the regression approach in a number of ways. Firstly, this approach naturally handles non-linearities and structural change -jumps from high to lowwhich the regression approach does not. Secondly, all the other factors, which are treated as deterministic influences in the regression approach are treated stochastically: reflected in the conditional probabilities of choosing high or low. Thirdly, military expenditures are now discrete, taking two values high and low, rather than continuous as in regression models.
Obviously, this approach can only be applied where it is sensible to treat the outcomes as dichotomous. Therefore, it could not be applied to military expenditures which are trended upwards and there is no natural classification into high and low. However, it can be applied to shares of military expenditure. Figure 1 plots the share of military expenditure in Greece and Turkey, taken from SIPRI, for the period 1958 1997. It is clear that there have been marked changes both in the level of the Greek and Turkish shares and the relationship between them. To a first approximation the series appear to be well described by variations around distinct high and low levels, so modelling them in terms of a simple high-low choice plus some random errors may not be too unrealistic.
Measurement
The choice of the appropriate measure of military preparations in arms race models has been a matter of great controversy. Brauer (1999) discusses the issues in the case of Greece and Turkey and reviews the various choices in the literature. For a country involved in an enduring hostility the focus must be on military capability: the probability of prevailing in a conflict. This will be a function of its levels of forces, measured by military capital (troops, stocks of weapons etc.), relative to those of its opponent. However, capability will also depend on how well those forces are used; a matter of strategy, tactics, training and leadership. Measuring military capability ex ante, before an actual conflict, is inherently problematical. Measuring forces is easier, but the long list of elements which go to make up a force structure cannot be well summarised by a single number. In the case of Greece and Turkey the issue of forces is complicated by the 
Estimation
Estimation of the strategies in a simple two by two game in which each side choses high or low can be done using the bivariate Hamilton discrete state switching model. This has been widely used in economics (see Hamilton, 1988 Hamilton, , 1989 Hamilton, , 1990 Hamilton, and 1996 Sola & Driffil, 1994; Ravn & Sola, 1995) to capture movements in time series due, for example, to changes in macroeconomic policies or other shocks. However, to our knowledge the bivariate regime-switching model has not been used to estimate strategies in a simple game or given this game-theoretic interpretation.
Given that the discrete regime-switching technique has not been widely used in peace research, it may be useful to provide a non-technical explanation.
Univariate Case
To begin, consider the univariate case. We could look at the time-series for the Greek share of military expenditure and note that it roughly divides into two regimes or states: high, say above 5%, and low, 5% or below. We could then measure the mean value for the high state (the observations above 5% 
one would observe equal time in both states but with lots of switches between them. Of course, all this analysis is conditional on our initial choice of a discrete threshold of 5%. However, we do not need a discrete threshold.
Given estimates of the high and low means and the variance of the errors around them and assuming normality, one can estimate the probability that a particular observation is in the high state or the low state. Thus each observation has a probability of being in the high state, rather than putting them in the high state with probability one if the share is over 5%. One can then choose estimates of the 5 free parameters (high and low means, the variance of the errors around those means and the associated transition probabilities, L π and H π ) that are most likely to have generated the observed sample of data. These maximum likelihood estimates are obtained by numerical optimisation. On the basis of those parameter estimates, one can also calculate the filter probabilities for each year, the probability that they are in a high state or a low state. So for
gives the probabilities of being in the high state, given the history of the process. If the two state model is a good description of the process, these filter probabilities should be close to one or zero, indicating a clear separation between the two regimes. Notice these filter probabilities, which differ from year to year are distinct from the transition probabilities, which are constant over time.
Bivariate Case
In the bivariate case there are four states rather than two as in the univariate case. The four states are: (1) both high, (2) Greece high, Turkey low, (3) Greece low, Turkey high and (4) both low.
Then in addition to the Greek means for the high and low state and the Greek variance, the Turkish means for the high and low states and the Turkish variance have to be estimated. In addition, the shocks, representing the unmeasured influences, to the two countries are unlikely to be independent, so the covariance between the shocks hitting the two countries needs to be estimated. Since both are members of NATO and faced a common Soviet threat, the shocks are likely to be positively correlated. In the univariate case, the transition matrix has 4 elements, two of which are free. In the bivariate case, the transition matrix has 16 elements, 12 of which are free. The evolution of the series is described by a four by four transition matrix, Π , the elements of which, ij π give the probability of moving from state i in period t to state j in period 1
. So 11 π gives the probability of staying in state 1, both countries having high shares of military expenditure in the next period, given they both have high shares this period. Because the system must move to one of the four states in the next period, each of the four columns of the transition matrix sums to unity, as the columns did in the univariate case above. Thus the unrestricted transition matrix has 12 free probabilities which can be estimated together with the mean shares of military expenditure in the high and low states for each country, the variance of the shocks for each country and the covariance between the shocks to each country. This is 19 free parameters in total. The parameter estimates are obtained by maximising the likelihood function as in the univariate case. On the basis of the estimates, one can calculate the filter probabilities for each year. This gives the probability of being in each of the four states, given the history of the process, for instance )
gives the probability of both countries being high in a particular year. If the four state model is a good description of the process, these probabilities should be close to one or zero, indicating a clear separation between the four regimes.
The unrestricted case allows unlimited dependence in the decisions of the two countries.
We also consider three restricted transition matrices. The first assumes that each country determines its share of military expenditure independently. If two events A and B are independent, the probability of both happening is the product of the probabilities of each of them happening:
. Similarly, the probability of staying in state 1, both high, is just the product of the probability of Greece staying in the high state and the probability of 
The second and third restricted versions assume that one or other country plays tit-for-tat and follows the leader. That is that Greece (Turkey) is always in the state that Turkey (Greece) was one period ago. In this case there are only two free probabilities, that of the leader staying in the high state or of the leader staying in the low state. Suppose Greece leads and Turkey plays tit-for-tat, then Turkey will always be in the state Greece was one period ago. There are then only two free probabilities, that represent Greek strategy, GH π and GL π and the transition matrix GlT Π is given by:
If Greece is high this period, Turkey will be high next period, so any state with Turkey low has zero probability. What drives the system is the probabilities of Greece staying in the high or low states. Similarly if Turkey leads Greece, the transition matrix
Stochastic Representation
Consider 
where the indices H and L refer to 'high' and 'low'. R they can be used even when some of the models are non-nested. In this case none of the restricted versions are nested within each other, although all the restricted models are nested within the general model.
Empirical Results
In this section we apply the technique outlined above to SIPRI annual data on Greek and Turkish shares of military expenditure 1958-1997. First, the unrestricted Markov structure is estimated, which allows for twelve free probabilities in the transition matrix. The first column of Table I gives the estimates of the other parameters for the general, unrestricted, model. The Greece Low state has a mean military expenditure of 4.37% of GDP, the Greece High state has a mean 2.16 percentage points of GDP higher, and this shift is very significant, with a t ratio over 15. The between the shocks to the two countries, that is on the margin of significance at the 5% level. . Figure 2 plots the filter probabilities of being in each state of the four regimes from the unrestricted, general, model. For instance, the top left quadrant of Figure 2 , gives the probability in each year of being in state 1, both high. This probability is zero, up to 1973, jumps to about 0.7 in 1974 (the invasion of Cyprus) and to one in 1975. It stays at one or close to one till 1983, drops to 0.1 in 1984, and then is zero for the remainder of the period. Table II gives Although there is some correspondence, it is interesting that the division into states does not match up neatly with military rule: 1967 to 1974 for Greece and 1960 Greece and -61, 1971 Greece and -73 and 1980 Greece and -1983 for Turkey.
The first restriction tested is that the probability of switching between states in each country is independent. Each country has its own probabilities of switching, which does not depend on the state the other country is in. This reduces the number of free parameters in the transition matrix from 12 to 4, two for each country. This would be the case if each was responding to its own domestic political economy or strategic concerns, which determined the probability of staying in the high state or the low state, without regard for whether the other was in a high or low state. Imposing independence reduces the maximised log-likelihood from 15.2 to 10.6, see Table III 
. It should be noted that, as Ravn & Sola (1995) point out, independence of the two countries transition probabilities does not imply that the two series are independent or that they cannot change regime simultaneously; it simply means that the unobserved states that generate the changes in means can be modelled as independent Markov chains. In this case, there will be positive covariance through the error terms for instance, shocks (e.g. Cyprus or, in the past, increased Soviet threat) will hit them both in the same way.
The second and third restrictions tested were that one country determined its state independently and the other played tit-for-tat, playing what the leader had played in the previous period. The Greece leads Turkey or Turkey leads Greece restrictions lead to a large reduction in the maximised log likelihood. Using Likelihood Ratio tests both restrictions are rejected at the 1% level. For the hypothesis Turkey leads Greece, the test statistic is 40.2 compared to a 1% χ (10) of 23.21. For the hypothesis Greece leads Turkey the test statistic is 30.9 with the same critical value. The AIC and SBC also suggest that the independent model is preferred to the leader-follower models. Even though they are rejected, the restricted estimates are of some interest. The estimates for the Greece leads Turkey case are given in the second column of Table   I and the state probabilities are given in Figure 3 . In addition to rejection on the test there are a number of other features which suggest the model is unsatisfactory. Firstly, the allocation into regimes is less clear cut. If we allocate years to regimes on the basis that the probability is greater than 0.5, only two states are predicted: both high or both low. They are in the both high regime 1975-1988 and in the both low regime otherwise. Secondly, under the Greece leads Turkey restriction, the difference between the high and low state for Turkey is only just on the margin of significance, rather than clearly determined as it was in the unrestricted and independent models. Thirdly, the covariance between the errors is not significantly different from zero. On all criteria the independent decision model is clearly superior.
Conclusions
The simplest possible model for an arms race is one in which each country chooses either a high or a low share of military expenditure in output. Usually, in such games the payoffs are assumed to be those of the Prisoners' dilemma. While we cannot observe the payoffs, we can estimate the countries' strategies in such a game: the probabilities that each country will choose a high or a We are not aware that the regime switching model has been used to estimate strategies in simple games before. However, in cases such as this where there are two players, the choice variable is stationary and the values the choice variable takes can be approximated by high and low regimes, it seems a useful procedure. It is also interesting that a very simple theoretical model translates into quite a complicated empirical model. To apply the simple unrestricted two by two game to data on observed choices requires 19 free parameters. However, these parameters can be related to game theory strategies in a straightforward way, which is not the case with regression based arms race models. Theories about the possible strategies followed by the players, such as independence or tit-for-tat, can reduce the parameter space substantially. Of course, different problems require different models and there are other arms races where the traditional Richardson regression approach will be more appropriate than the simple game approach. 1974 -1983 1975 -1988 State 2 1984 -1988 -State 3 1961 -1967 -State 4 1958 -1960 1968 -1973 1989 -1997 1958 -1974 1989 -1997 
